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It is shown that (i) all entangled states can be mapped by single-copy measurements into prob-
ability distributions containing secret correlations, and (ii) if a probability distribution obtained
from a quantum state contains secret correlations, then this state has to be entangled. These results
prove the existence of a two-way connection between secret and quantum correlations in the process
of preparation. They also imply that either it is possible to map any bound entangled state into a
distillable probability distribution or bipartite bound information exists.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
Entanglement and secret correlations are fundamental
resources in Quantum Information Theory and Cryptog-
raphy, respectively. They both share the property of be-
ing monogamous [1], in the sense that the more two par-
ties share quantum or secret correlations, the less they
are correlated to the outside world. This fact suggests
that these two concepts are closely related.
In the last years, several authors analyzed the link be-
tween quantum and secret correlations. Already in 1991,
Ekert [2] proposed a cryptography protocol whose secu-
rity was based on the violation of a Bell inequality [3].
More recently, this link has been exploited for proving
the security of most of the existing quantum cryptogra-
phy protocols, e.g. Shor-Preskill proof [4] of the security
of the BB84 scheme [5]. Further relations were later ana-
lyzed in [6, 7]. A qualitative equivalence between entan-
glement and key distillability has been shown in the cases
of two-qubit and of one-copy distillable states [8]. There
even exist quantitative analogies: the rates of entangle-
ment and of secret key distillability for some one-way
communication protocols are equal [9]. All these results
suggested the existence of a correspondence between en-
tanglement and secret key distillability, in the sense that
a quantum state could be transformed into a private key
if and only if it was distillable. However, the recent re-
sults of [10] have proven this statement to be false: there
are non-distillable quantum states, also known as bound
entangled, that are useful for establishing a secret key.
Up to now, the connection between quantum and se-
cret correlations has mainly been analyzed from the point
of view of distilling or extracting these resources from
quantum states. However, very little is known about the
process of preparation, i.e. about the resources required
for the formation of a quantum state or a probability
distribution. Recall that a state of a composite quan-
tum system is entangled if and only if it cannot be pre-
pared by local operations and classical communication
(LOCC), that is iff it requires truly quantum correla-
tions (i.e. classical correlations are not sufficient for its
preparation). In a similar way, for a given probability
distribution, one may wonder what the cost of its dis-
tribution is, in terms of secret bits, when only classical
resources are used. Following [11], we say that a proba-
bility distribution contains secret correlations if and only
if it cannot be distributed using only local operations
and public communication, that is iff it requires the use
of a private channel, (i.e. public communication is not
sufficient for its distribution).
In this work we study those probability distribution de-
rived from single-copy measurements on bipartite quan-
tum systems. We prove that (i) all entangled states can
be mapped by single-copy measurements into probabil-
ity distributions containing secret correlations and (ii) if
a probability distribution containing secret correlations
can be derived from a state ρAB, then ρAB has to be
entangled. Accordingly, in strong contrast to the case
of distillability, in the preparation process there exists a
one-to-one relation between secret and quantum correla-
tions. As far as we know, this result represents the first
two-way connection between these two resources, entan-
glement and secret correlations. In particular, our results
imply that all bound entangled states are useful to dis-
tribute secret correlations [12], a task that is impossible
using only LOCC. But let us start reviewing some basic
facts about entanglement and secret correlations.
In the modern theory of quantum correlations, the
usual scenario consists of two parties, Alice and Bob,
sharing a quantum state ρAB in a system C
dA⊗CdB . The
impurity of the state is due to the coupling to the envi-
ronment. The basic unit of entanglement is the entangled
bit or ebit, represented by a singlet state, or maximally
entangled state of two qubits, |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2.
Given ρAB, one would like to know (i) how many ebits
are required for its preparation and (ii) how many ebits
can be extracted from it by LOCC. These two funda-
mental questions define the separability and distillability
problems. Associated to them, there exist two entan-
glement measures, the so-called Entanglement Cost, Ec,
[13] and Distillable Entanglement, ED, [14]. Those states
for which Ec > 0 require ebits for being prepared, they
contain quantum correlations. Separable states can be
prepared by LOCC [15], so Ec = 0.
2Moving to secret correlations, the usual scenario con-
sists of two honest parties, Alice and Bob, and an eaves-
dropper, Eve, having access to independent realizations
of three random variables, X , Y and Z, characterized by
a probability distribution P (X,Y, Z). Alice and Bob’s
symbols have some correlations, and they are also par-
tially correlated with Eve. The basic unit is now the se-
cret bit, that is a probability distribution P (X,Y, Z) =
P (X,Y )P (Z) where X and Y are binary and locally ran-
dom, P (X = Y ) = 1 and Eve’s symbols are decoupled
from Alice and Bob’s result. Similarly as above, given
P (X,Y, Z), one can look for the amount of secret bits (i)
needed for its preparation and (ii) that can be extracted
from it by local operations and public classical com-
munication [6, 7]. The corresponding measures are the
so-called Information of Formation, Iform(X ;Y |Z), pro-
posed in [11] as the classical analog of Ec, and the Secret-
Key Rate, S(X ;Y ||Z), introduced in [16]. As for the en-
tanglement scenario, a positive information of formation
means that the correlations P (X,Y, Z) cannot be dis-
tributed using only local operations and public commu-
nication, secret bits are needed. Therefore, P (X,Y, Z)
contains secret correlations iff Iform(X ;Y |Z) > 0 [12].
All these measures, EC and ED as well as S(X ;Y ||Z)
and Iform(X ;Y |Z), have been defined from an opera-
tional point of view and are hard to compute. For our
purpose, it is necessary to have bounds on these quanti-
ties. In the case of secret correlations, it is known that
the so-called intrinsic information, I(X ;Y ↓ Z), provides
a lower bound to the information of formation [11] and
an upper bound to the secret-key rate [16],
S(X ;Y ||Z) ≤ I(X ;Y ↓ Z) ≤ Iform(X ;Y |Z). (1)
This function, originally introduced in [16], is defined
as follows: from P (X,Y, Z) one can compute for any
Z the conditioned probability distribution P (X,Y |Z) =
P (X,Y, Z)/P (Z). The total mutual information between
X and Y conditioned on Z, I(X ;Y |Z), is the mutual in-
formation of P (X,Y |Z) averaged over all Z. The intrin-
sic information then reads
I(X ;Y ↓ Z) = min
Z→Z¯
I(X ;Y |Z¯), (2)
the minimization running over all the channels Z → Z¯.
In order to link quantum and secret correlations, we
need two more remarks.
First, the adversary, Eve, appears in the quantum case
in a less explicit way than in cryptography, where her
presence is essential for the problem to be meaningful. If
Alice and Bob share a state ρAB, the natural way of in-
cluding Eve is to add a third system purifying it, in such a
way that the global state of the three parties is |ΨABE〉 ∈
C
dA⊗CdB⊗CdE and ρAB = trE(|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |). Thus,
all the environment is conservatively associated to the ad-
versary. Given ρAB, |ΨABE〉 is uniquely specified up to
an irrelevant unitary transformation on Eve’s space [17].
Next, measurements are required for mapping the po-
tential quantum correlations into probability distribu-
tions. We denote by MZ the positive operators defin-
ing Eve’s measurement, where
∑
Z MZ = 1E , and in a
similar wayMX andMY define Alice and Bob’s measure-
ments. Thus, given a state |ΨABE〉 and measurements for
each party, the corresponding probability distribution is
P (X,Y, Z) = tr(MX ⊗MY ⊗MZ |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |), (3)
while Alice and Bob’s probability distribution is
P (X,Y ) =
∑
Z
P (X,Y, Z) = tr(MX ⊗MY ρAB). (4)
Notice that the map (3) is not one-to-one, since there
may be many choices of measurements and states lead-
ing to the same probability distribution. And even if
the measurements by Alice, Bob and Eve are fixed, there
may be many states compatible with Eq. (3). There-
fore, P (X,Y, Z) together with MX , MY and MZ define
equivalence classes in the space of states |ΨABE〉 [18].
We have now introduced all the main ideas and can
concentrate on the case where Alice and Bob perform
local measurements MX and MY on an unknown state
ρAB. Assume that they can infer from their data P (X,Y )
that the state ρAB is entangled. Recall that the detec-
tion of entanglement through local measurements can
always be done by means of an entanglement witness
W , i.e. by measuring an observable in C
dA ⊗ CdB
such that for all product states |ab〉, 〈ab|W |ab〉 ≥ 0.
Recall furthermore that all operators can be decom-
posed into a linear combination of product operators:
W (cXY ) =
∑
X,Y cXYMX ⊗ MY . Accordingly, when-
ever a linear combination of Alice and Bob local mea-
surements provides an entanglement witness W , they
can compute its expectation value from their data:
tr(W (cXY )ρAB) =
∑
X,Y cXY P (X,Y ). And whenever
this expectation value is negative, Alice and Bob can
conclude that the state ρAB they share is entangled.
In such a case we say that the probability distribution,
P (X,Y ), for the measurements MX and MY , is incom-
patible with any separable state. Actually, it was proven
in [18] that Alice and Bob can discard any separable state
as the origin of the observed correlations iff they can con-
struct from their data an entanglement witness such that
tr(W (cXY )ρAB) < 0. We can now state our main result.
Let |ΨABE〉 be a quantum state shared by Alice, Bob
and Eve. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Alice and Bob’s state, ρAB, is entangled.
2. There exist measurements by Alice and Bob, MX
and MY , such that for any measurement by Eve,
MZ , the corresponding probability distribution
P (A,B,E) (3) contains secret correlations.
This result is indeed a corollary of the following theorem.
3Theorem: Let P (X,Y ) be a probability distribution
shared by Alice and Bob after measuring MX , MY on a
unknown state. Then, (i) P (X,Y ), for the measurements
MX andMY , is incompatible with any separable state (4)
if and only if (ii) for all the purifications |ΨABE〉, compat-
ible with the observed data (4), and for all measurements
MZ by Eve, P (X,Y, Z) contains secret correlations.
Proof: For the (i) ⇒ (ii) part, assume that Alice
and Bob detect the entanglement of the unknown state
ρAB used for the correlation distribution by means of an
entanglement witness W (cXY ) =
∑
X,Y cXYMX ⊗MY
built from their measurements, i.e. tr(WρAB) < 0.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume that there
is a global state |ΨABE〉 and a measurement by Eve,
MZ , such that the corresponding probability distribu-
tion P (X,Y, Z) = tr(MX ⊗ MY ⊗ MZ |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |)
admits P (X,Y ) as marginal, but does not contain any
secret correlations. This implies I(X ;Y ↓ Z) = 0 for
P (X,Y, Z), hence there is a channel P (Z¯|Z) such that
I(X ;Y |Z¯) = 0, i.e.
P (X,Y |Z¯) = P (X |Z¯)P (Y |Z¯). (5)
Denote by ρZ the state shared by Alice and Bob when
Eve’s result is Z:
ρZ =
1
P (Z)
trE(1 ⊗MZ |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |), (6)
where P (Z) = tr(1 ⊗MZ |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |) and by ρZ¯ the
state after Eve’s classical processing
ρZ¯ =
1
P (Z¯)
∑
Z
P (Z)P (Z¯|Z)ρZ , (7)
where P (Z¯) =
∑
Z P (Z)P (Z¯|Z) and the positive opera-
tors MZ¯ =
∑
Z P (Z¯|Z)MZ define another measurement,
since
∑
Z¯ MZ¯ = 1E [19]. From Eq. (5) we have that,
∀X,Y ,
tr(MX ⊗MY ρZ¯) = tr(MX ρAZ¯)tr(MY ρBZ¯), (8)
where ρAZ¯ (ρBZ¯) denotes the state after tracing Bob
(Alice) out in ρZ¯ . Define the separable state ρ
S
AB =∑
P (Z¯)ρAZ¯ ⊗ ρBZ¯ . Using that ρAB =
∑
Z P (Z)ρZ =∑
Z¯ P (Z¯)ρZ¯ , it follows from Eq. (8) that
tr(WρAB) = tr(Wρ
S
AB) < 0, (9)
which is a contradiction with the assumption that W is
an entanglement witness. Therefore, Iform(X ;Y |Z) ≥
I(X ;Y ↓ Z) > 0 for all the states |ΨABE〉 and all Eve’s
measurements. This conclude the (i) ⇒ (ii) part of the
proof.
For the (ii) ⇒ (i) part, we proceed again by contra-
diction (see also [6, 18]). Assume that there exists a
separable state ρAB compatible with the observed data
P (X,Y ). Since ρAB is separable, it can be expressed as
ρAB =
nZ∑
Z=1
P (Z)|aZ bZ〉〈aZ bZ |. (10)
Consider the purification
|ΨABE〉 =
nZ∑
i=1
√
P (Z)|aZ bZ〉|Z〉, (11)
where |ΨABE〉 ∈ CdA ⊗ CdB ⊗ CnZ and |Z〉 are nZ or-
thonormal vectors. If Eve applies the measurement de-
fined by MZ = |Z〉〈Z|, we have that for all Alice and
Bob’s measurements
P (X,Y |Z) = tr(MX ⊗MY |aZ bZ〉〈aZ bZ |) =
tr(MX |aZ〉〈aZ |)tr(MY |bZ〉〈bZ |) = P (X |Z)P (Y |Z). (12)
Now, it is clear that these correlations could be as well
generated using public communication. The random
variables X and Y are locally generated according to one
of the nZ probability distributions P (X |Z) and P (Y |Z).
The choice among these probability distributions is made
according to the probability distribution P (Z). Alice and
Bob correlate this choice through the message Z that one
of the parties generates and sends to the other through
a public channel (or a source to both parties). This clas-
sical message is accessible to Eve. No secret bits are
required for this distribution, thus Iform = 0, which con-
tradicts statement (ii). Hence there is no separable state
ρAB compatible with the observed data P (X,Y ). 
Corollary: Consider an entangled state ρAB =
trE(|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |), where |ΨABE〉 denotes the global
state including Eve. There always exist measurements
by Alice and Bob mapping this state into a probability
distribution containing secret correlations, independently
of Eve’s measurement.
Proof: This easily follows from the previous Theorem
together with two known results: (i) any entangled state
is detected by an entanglement witness [20] and (ii) any
entanglement witness can be decomposed in terms of ten-
sor product of operators defining local measurements, i.e.
can be computed by local measurements [21]. 
These statements prove the announced “if and only if”
connection between secret and quantum correlations in
the process of preparation. Note that all the proofs have
been derived using single-copy measurements. This fact
allows to easily translate our conclusions from entangle-
ment based to prepare and measure protocols using the
same ideas as in [22] (see also [18]). In the following lines,
several implications of the results are discussed.
First, the presented connection is as strong as it could
be. Consider that Alice and Bob are connected by an
unknown quantum channel (share an unknown state).
As soon as their measurements outcomes detect that the
channel allows one to distribute entanglement, they know
to share secrecy, no matter what Eve does [12]. Alice and
Bob may not have enough information from the obtained
measurement results for completely determine their chan-
nel. Still, if their data are only compatible with entangle-
ment, the observed distribution contains secret bits. On
4the other hand, if the measured correlations are compati-
ble with a separable state, no secret key can be extracted
from them [18]. Indeed, from the observed data Alice and
Bob cannot exclude that I(X ;Y ↓ Z) = 0, which implies
S(X ;Y ||Z) = 0. Thus, any entangling channel can be
seen as a source of privacy.
Next, all this discussion is independent of the distilla-
bility properties of quantum states. Indeed, the previous
corollary provides a systematic way of mapping bound
entangled states into probability distribution containing
secrecy. An interesting open question is whether all these
probability distributions are distillable into a perfect key
(c.f. [10]). It follows from our results that at least one
of the two following possibilities must be true [23] (i) all
bound entangled states can be mapped into distillable
probability distributions or (ii) there exist classical prob-
ability distributions having non-distillable secret corre-
lations. In this case, they would provide examples of
bipartite probability distributions with bound informa-
tion, the cryptographic analog of bound entanglement
conjectured in [6] (see also [24]).
Finally, our results also shed light on what the dif-
ferences between bound entangled states and the set of
LOCC operations are. It is known that these states do
not improve the fidelity of teleportation compared to
LOCC [25]. On the other hand, there are examples of
bound entangled states violating some inequalities for
variance of observables that are satisfied by separable
states [26]. Moving to secret correlations, there exist
bound entangled states that are useful for key distribu-
tion [10]. Here, it is proven that all bound entangled
states can be transformed into probability distributions
that, from the point of view of its secrecy features, can
never be established by LOCC.
To conclude, in this work we have shown the corre-
spondence between secret and quantum correlations in
the process of preparation. Given a probability distribu-
tion, its formation using quantum resources needs entan-
gled states if and only if an alternative preparation using
classical resources requires secret bits.
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